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Illinois Tort Law: A Rich History
of Cooperation and Respect
Between the Courts and the Legislature
Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens" &Mark D. Taylor**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Litigation addressing the constitutionality of the Illinois Civil Justice
Reform Amendments of 1995 ("Civil Justice Reform Act")' raises a
fundamental question that has been largely overlooked in the broader
public dialogue about tort, or liability, reform2 : Should tort law be
decided by courts or legislatures?
The question about who should "make" the law is not academic; tort
law affects people's lives, every day. Tort law can discourage conduct
such as medical malpractice and help remove truly defective products
* Senior Partner, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1962, Boston
University; J.D., 1965, Columbia University. Mr. Schwartz is the drafter of the Model
Uniform Product Liability Act and has recently been appointed to the Advisory
Committee of the American Law Institute's Restatement Of The Law Of Torts: Products
Liability and Restatement Of The Law Of Torts: Apportionment Of Liability projects.
He is co-author of John W. Wade ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS (9th ed. 1994) and author of Victor E. Schwartz, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1994).
* * Senior Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1987,
University of Wisconsin-Madison; J.D., 1990, Vanderbilt University.
* * * Senior Associate, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1981,
Boise State University; J.D., 1991, University of Utah.
+ The authors would like to thank Hugh F. Young, Jr., Executive Director of Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc. ("PLAC"), for his valuable support and guidance in the
development of this Article. PLAC is a nonprofit corporation with a membership of
over 110 major manufacturers from a broad cross-section of American industry. In
addition, PLAC has approximately 300 sustaining members, who are leading product
liability defense attorneys from across the United States. PLAC was formed for the
purpose of submitting amicus curiae briefs in important appellate cases involving
significant public policy issues affecting the law of product liability. This Article was
developed from an amicus curiae brief we prepared on PLAC's behalf in support of the
Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995.
1. Pub. Act No. 89-7 (codified in chs. 430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, and 820 of ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 1996)).
2. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Mark D. Taylor, Who Should Decide
America's Tort Law?-The Battle Between Legislatures and Courts (monograph,
Washington Legal Foundation, March 1997).
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from the marketplace. 3 But, unchecked, unbalanced tort law can
remove good products from the marketplace, discourage innovation,
limit the supply of necessary medical services, result in loss of jobs,
and unduly raise costs for consumers. 4 In light of the profound
impacts that tort law may have on society, it is important that state
legislatures, as well as courts, have their voices heard and respected.
This Article will discuss in detail the historical role of state legislatures
and, in particular, the role of the Illinois General Assembly in
developing tort law.
First, this Article will demonstrate that the prerogative of state
legislatures in general to decide broad public policy in tort and other
areas dates to the beginning of statehood and has been respected by
state courts.5 This Article then proceeds to discuss the proper roles for
the Illinois General Assembly and Illinois courts in developing tort
law.6 Focusing on the modification of various common law causes of
action and workers' compensation statutes, the Article will then trace
the legislative development of Illinois tort law from the beginning of
statehood, through the nineteenth century, and into the early part of the
twentieth century. 7 Next, this Article will discuss more recent
legislative tort law developments in Illinois, including the 1995 Civil
Justice Reform Act. 8 The Article concludes that, as a matter of history
and good public policy, the 1995 Civil Justice Reform Act should be
respected by Illinois courts. 9
II. A PAGE OF LEGAL HISTORY-THE HISTORIC ROLES OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TORT LAW

A. The "Reception Statutes"
In the debate about who should decide state tort law-legislatures or
courts-a fundamental part of legal history has been largely
overlooked. State legislatures, not courts, were the first to create state
tort law. When colonies and territories became states, one of the first
3. See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 196,
196-98 (1995) (explaining that tort law encourages safer activities).
4. See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353 (1988) (recognizing that greater liability means higher
prices for consumers).
5. See infra Part 11.
6. See infra Part lL.
7. See infra Part IV.A-B.
8. See infra Part IV.C-D.
9. See infra Part V.
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acts of state legislatures was to "receive" the Common Law of England
as of a certain date and have that provide a basis for a state's tort law.'0
In the same piece of legislation, called a "reception statute," state
legislators delegated to state courts the authority to develop the English
Common Law in accordance with the "public policy" of the state.I
These long-forgotten statutes were the basic vehicle through which
legislative power was vested in state judiciaries.12
Early state legislatures delegated the task of developing tort law to
state judiciaries, because the legislatures did not have the time, or
perhaps the inclination, to formulate an extensive "tort code." They
faced more extensive and pressing tasks, such as the formulation of
the very basics of a "new society." As some "reception statutes" made
clear, however, what the legislature delegated, it could retrieve, at any
time. 3
B. From Incrementalism to "Making" Tort Law
For over 200 years, the authority delegated to courts to develop the
common law of torts continued and, in most instances, worked well.
Courts developed the "common law" in a slow, incremental fashion in
accordance with societal needs.
For example, in the 19th century in every state, a person's right to
recover for an injury was barred if he or she was in any way at fault.' 4
Gradually, state courts narrowed this so-called "contributory
negligence defense" and developed exceptions to it, such as not
applying it when the defendant had a "last clear chance" to avoid an
accident or where the defendant engaged in "reckless" behavior. "
Finally, after over 100 years of gradual development, some courts
converted to a "comparative fault" system where the plaintiffs fault

10. Charles A. Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and
Mentschikoff." The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.
351, 363 (1983) (recognizing that "reception statutes were the mechanism for
transfering the common law of England to the new United States .
.
I I. For a list of many statutes, see Schwartz, supra note 2.
12. Kent Greenwalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. REV.
621, 649 (1987).
13. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 1993) (establishing that the Illinois
General Assembly could repeal any part of the English common law). See also City of
Sterling v. Speroni, 84 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Ill. App., 2d Dist. 1949) (noting that the
common law is in force until repealed by statute).
14. See WILLIAM PROSSER & PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451-52 (5th ed.
1984).
i5. See id. § 66, at 462-64.
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and the recovery reduced
would be compared with that of a defendant
6
by the percentage of plaintiff fault.1
In the 1970s, however, some courts strayed from this incremental
approach. Judicial "lawmaking" was no longer gradual or
evolutionary, but bold-faced, new, and sometimes revolutionary in
content. For example, for over two centuries punitive damages were
reserved for a small class of torts involving intentional wrongs, such
as assault and battery, libel and slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and intentional interferences with property. 7 The cases
involved one or perhaps a few injured plaintiffs and one defendant
who had engaged in intentional wrongdoing. Then, some courts
applied the punitive damages concept to product liability without
careful consideration that suddenly there was one defendant with many
potential plaintiffs who could seek to punish the defendant repeatedly
for essentially the same conduct. 8
In addition, some state courts retroactively changed the standard for
when punitive damages could be imposed. They began to use vague
phrases such as "gross negligence" as the standard for imposing
punishment.' 9 These looser standards could lead to severe economic
punishment; they gave potential defendants little "notice" of what was
expected of them in terms of behavioral norms.
In another example of judicial lawmaking, some courts went beyond
imposing so-called "strict liability" against product manufacturers and,
without careful consideration for public policy implications, created
absolute liability. Under absolute liability, manufacturers would be
liable for their failure to warn about a risk that could not have been
16. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (3d ed. 1994).
17. See Victor Schwartz & Mark Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1993).
18. One of the most perceptive and learned judges of this century recognized the
problem and warned against it. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (noting the court's "gravest difficulty in
perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout
the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill").
Other courts began-contrary to 200-year old precedent-to permit recovery of
punitive damages in contract actions, such as an action for breach of implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. See Michael L. Miner, Note, The Expanding Availability of
Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975).

As Justice Sandra

Day O'Connor pointed out in the dissent in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
"[u]nheard of only 30 years ago, bad faith contract actions now account for a substantial
percentage of all punitive damage awards." 499 U.S. 1, 62 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988); Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
Inc., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991).
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discovered, or for a design when there was no feasible alternative way
for the product to be made.2 0 The implications of these decisions on
our society as a whole, namely their effect on product innovation or
insurability, were ignored.
C. Legislatures Retrieve their Power
In response to these cases, some state legislatures in the 1970s
began to "retrieve" their clear historical right to decide tort law.2 Most
state courts respected these actions as appropriate legislative
prerogatives and policy choices.22
In the 1980s, problems of uninsurability and adverse effects
resulting from open-ended and uncertain rules regarding liability led
many state legislatures to increase their involvement in deciding tort
law.2 3 Plaintiffs' groups challenged these reforms under provisions of
state constitutions and had successes in some, but not most, states.
D. Lochner Redux-Decisions That Replicate
A Discredited Opinion of ConstitutionalLaw
Many of the decisions overturning tort reform statutes have been
premised on the assumption that state courts have a fundamental and
exclusive right to make state tort law. 24 The decisions ignore basic
legal history; that is, they fail to recognize the legislative enactment of
the "reception" statutes. In addition, these decisions also betray a
solipsistic view of the formulation of public policy-the formulation of
tort law has never been the exclusive province of any one branch of
government.25 Furthermore, the cases often show judges substituting
20. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986);
Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 596 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 1992); Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson
Baby Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991).
2 i. See infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
22. See generally JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 807-09 (9th ed. 1994).

23. For example, Beshada and Halphen were overruled by legislation so as to require
proof of defect. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1) (West 1991); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:58C-3(3) (1987 & Supp. 1996). A Maryland case, which held a handgun
manufacturer strictly liable for personal injuries resulting from a properly functioning
"Saturday Night Special," was similarly overruled by legislation. See Kelley v. R.G.
Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE OF 1957, art. 27, § 36-1(h)
(Michie 1990) (overruling Kelley).
24. See Schwartz, supra note 2.
25. As United States Supreme Court Justice Jackson noted so eloquently many years
ago:
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
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their own views of what tort law "ought to be" for that of the
legislature; they do not represent sound constitutional law decisions.
Most importantly, the decisions create precedents so that courts in
the future can nullify a wide array of state legislation, whether
conservative or liberal, in support of tort reform or not. The decisions
are reminiscent of a very bleak and highly discredited period in the
United States Supreme Court's history that began around the turn of
the century and ended in the mid-1930s. 26 During this period, known
as "the Lochner 7 era," the Court nullified acts of Congress that it
disagreed with, using the United States Constitution as a predicate for
its decisions.28
III. THE ROLES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND COURTS IN
DEVELOPING ILLINOIS TORT LAW

Shortly after Illinois became a state in 1818, the Illinois General
Assembly enacted one of its first tort laws, the Illinois Reception
Statute. The Illinois Reception Statute provides:
That the common law of England, so far as the same is
applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the
British parliament made in aid of, and to supply the defects of
the common law, prior to the fourth year of James the First,
excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 43d
Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of 13th Elizabeth, and ninth
chapter of 37th Henry Eighth, and which are of a general nature
and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness, but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
26. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to 8-7 (1978).
27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, Justice Peckam, writing
for the majority, invalidated a New York law that limited the amount of hours a baker
could work in a bakery. Id. at 64.
In his dissent, Justice Holmes argued that, unless legislation violates a fundamental
right, the Court should respect state legislation that is rationally related to a state's
legitimate goal. Id. at 75. Justice Holmes wrote:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do
not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement
or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of the majority to embody
their opinions in law.
Id. Justice Holmes further claimed that the Constitution did not enact "Mr. Herbert
Spencer's social statistics." Id.
28. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at §§ 8-2 to 8-7.
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shall be considered
as of full force until repealed by legislative
29
authority.

Under the reception statute, "[t]he legislature is formally recognized
as having a superior position to that of the courts in establishing
common law rules of decision., ' 30 The legislature "has the inherent
power to repeal or change the common law, or do away with all or part
of it."'
The rationale for legislative preeminence in deciding public policy
relates to the inherent strengths of the legislative process.32 As Chief
Justice Bilandic of the Illinois Supreme Court said just over a year
ago, public policy first and foremost "should emanate from the
legislature ' 33 because, among other reasons, "it is the only entity with
the power to weigh and properly balance the many competing societal,
economic, and policy considerations involved." 34
Legislatures are uniquely well-equipped to reach fully informed
decisions about the need for broad public policy changes in the law.35
They have more complete access to information, including the ability
to receive comments from persons representing a multiplicity of
perspectives and to use the legislative process to obtain new
information.36 If a point needs further elaboration, a witness can be
recalled or asked to respond to written questions. This process allows
legislatures to engage in broad policy deliberations and to formulate
policy carefully.37
29. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/I (West 1993) (emphasis added).
30. People v. Gersch, 553 N.E.2d 281, 286 (III. 1990) (citing People v. Davis, 116
N.E.2d 372, 374 (I11. 1953)).
31. Id.
32. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
33. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 160 (III. 1995).
34. Id. at 160. See also People v. Felella, 546 N.E.2d 492, 498 (I11. 1989) ("public
policy is the domain of the legislature").
35. See Michael J. Dittoe, Statutory Revision by Common Law Courts and the Nature
of Legislative Decision Making-A Response to Professor Calabresi, 28 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 235, 255-56 (1984). The author writes:
A legislature, in contrast to a court, does not decide a specific case but rather
enunciates a rule without the need for a specific wronged litigant to appear
before it and demand satisfaction .

. .

. A legislature can propose, consider,

and pass such a rule sua sponte, without being required to act.
Id.
36. See id at 256-59 (discussing the role of the legislature as the chief policy maker
of the state); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 201 (1989) (declaring
that, "[i]f the separation of powers means anything, it means that the task of creating
law falls upon the legislature, and the courts must obey and enforce the constitutionally
legitimate enactments of the legislative branch").
37. See generally Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 736 (Haw. 1991)
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Moreover, legislative consideration of major changes results in
prospective legislation that will give the public advance notice of
significant changes affecting rights and duties, and the time to comport
behavior accordingly. 8 As the United States Supreme Court has
noted in a recent decision regarding punitive damages, "[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate
that a person receive fair notice.., of the conduct that will subject him
to [liability] ....
Courts, on the other hand, are well-suited to adjudicate individual
disputes concerning discrete issues and parties. The Founding Fathers
recognized this when they drafted the United States Constitution 4to0
give the judiciary jurisdiction to decide "cases and controversies.
This particularized focus, however, involves some basic limitations: It
deprives the judiciary of the comprehensive access to information that
is essential to the formation of complex and sound tort policy rules.4"
Legislatures are also to be respected in their formulation of tort law
rules of conduct, because they can make their rules prospective.
Courts, following the common law process, institute their rulings on a
retroactive basis. Although this may be appropriate when
implementing minor adjustments to common law principles, it is not
appropriate when the "adjustments" precipitate a broad, fundamental
change in an available tort remedy. Changes which denote a sweeping
change of the rights and responsibilities of the public, should be done
prospectively, if at all, to provide "fair notice" to everyone potentially
affected.42
(Moon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's
application of "market share liability" to a blood products case, because "[there are too
many unanswered questions of social, economic, and legal import which only the
legislature, with its investigative powers and procedures, can determine"). The
American Law Institute's new draft Restatement on the law of products liability agrees
that when the government has superior access to information, it, rather than the courts,
should act. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20 (Proposed
Final Draft (Preliminary Version) Oct. 18, 1996) ("Issues relating to product recalls are
best evaluated by governmental agencies capable of gathering adequate data regarding
ramifications of such undertakings.").
38. See Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 17, at 1373-74.
39. BMW of N. America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996).
40. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (1970); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (Alexander Hamilton) (Random House 1937) (arguing that the
"interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts").
41. See also Alan Schwartz, supra note 4, at 368 (recognizing that "there is no
reason" to believe that courts possess the ability to assess tradeoffs with safety and
risks).
42. See BMW of N. America, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1598; Schwartz & Behrens, supra
note 17, at 1374.
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IV. THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY HISTORICALLY HAS HAD
A PREEMINENT ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE COMMON LAW

As mandated by the reception statute, the Illinois General Assembly
has played a preeminent role in developing the common law
throughout the state's history, having repealed or modified common
law causes of action on numerous occasions.43 It has fulfilled its end
of the reception statute without having its work nullified by Illinois
courts.
A. Early Examples of Legislative Retrieval or Modifying
Common Law Causes of Action-MaritalPropertyRights,
Commercial Law and Wrongful Death and Survival Acts
For example, when the General Assembly enacted the reception
statute, the system of marital property rights, including the feudal
common law concepts of dower, coverture, and curtesy, became the
law in Illinois.' "At common law a married woman had no separate
identity before the law; she was regarded as a chattel with neither
property or other rights against anyone, for her husband owned all her
property and asserted all her legal and equitable rights. 45 Yielding to
social changes, the General Assembly passed various statutes in the
1860s and 1870s which materially altered the common law marital
property system and the rights of married women.46 These changes
were respected by Illinois courts.47
At about this same time, the General Assembly also began to
retrieve the common law of contracts. In 1874, the General Assembly
enacted the Negotiable Instruments Act, which codified the common
law governing negotiable instruments.4 In 1907, the 1874 Act gave
way to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.4 9 A few years later,
43. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
44. See McNeer v. McNeer, 32 N.E. 681 (I11.
1892).
45. Brandt v. Keller, 109 N.E.2d 729, 730 (I11.
1952) (citing Snell v. Snell, 14 N.E.
684, 686 (111.
1888)).
46. See Snell v. Snell, 14 N.E. 684, 686 (III. 1888), for a discussion of the Married
Women's Acts of 1861 and 1874. See also Brandt v. Keller, 109 N.E.2d 729, 731 (111.
1952) (holding that Married Women's Act of 1874 modified common law by allowing
women to sue their husbands in contract and in tort); People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 179
N.E. 93 (I11.
1931) (Bastardy Act of 1919 eliminated common law prohibition
precluding testimony of married woman to establish paternity).
47. McNeer, 32 N.E. 681 (III. 1892); Snell, 14 N.E. 684 (II. 1888).
48. See Negotiable Instruments, 1874 Stats. Of Illinois 292-93 (approved on March
18, 1874); see also Keenan v. Blue, 88 N.E. 553 (111.
1909).
49. 1907 111.
Laws 403, repealed by 1961 Ill. Laws 2101, art. X, § 10-102 (codified at
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-102 (West 1993)). See also County of Macon v.
Edgecomb, 654 N.E.2d 598 (111.
App. Ct., 4th Dist. 1995) (citing 1907 III. Laws 403

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

in 1915, the General Assembly also chose to-codify the common law
of sales contracts by enacting the Uniform Sales Act.5 0 These
"uniform" acts effectively repealed a landmark English common law
case by Lord Mansfield, one of England's leading commercial
judges. 5' Nevertheless, we are aware of no reported decisions
challenging these various commercial statutes as exceeding the
legislature's authority to decide state policy.
The nineteenth century Illinois General Assembly also acted to fill
voids in the common law of torts. The Injuries Act of 1853, a
wrongful death statute, modified common law by allowing a wrongful
death action to be brought against a tortfeasor for the benefit of the
decedent's widow and next of kin.52 Notwithstanding that wrongful
death actions were unknown in England,53 The Survival Act of 1872
modified the common law by permitting personal injury actions to
"survive" one's death and be brought by a decedent's personal
representative. 4 Under the common law, "an action for damages for
personal injury abated with the death of the injured party in all cases
where the death was not the result of the injury., 55 The Illinois
wrongful death and survival statutes have been declared by the Illinois
Supreme Court to be constitutional.56

(eff. July 1, 1907)).
50. 1915 Ill. Laws 604, repealed by 1961 III. Laws 2101, art. X, § .10-102 (codified at
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-102 (West 1993)). In 1961, the legislature repealed
both the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act and the Uniform Sales Act and replaced
them with the Uniform Commercial Code. 1961 111.Laws 2101 (codified at 810 ILL.
COMP.STAT. 5/10-102 (West 1996)).
5 1. See Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1774).
52. See 1853 Ill. Laws 97 (codified at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1 (West Supp.
1997)).
1922) ("No right
53. See Bishop v. Chicago Rys. Co., 135 N.E. 439, 440 (Ill.
existed at common law to recover for the wrongful death of a person. The Injuries Act
passed by the Legislature of this state in 1853 created such a cause of action for the first
time in this state.").
54. 1871-72 111. Laws 77 (codified at 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-6 (West
1993)).
App. Ct., 2d Dist. 1952).
55. Vukovich v. Custer, 107 N.E.2d 426, 427 (111.
56. See McDaniel v. Bullard, 216 N.E.2d 140 (I1. 1966) (upholding constitutionality
of wrongful death and survival statutes); Zostautas v. St. Anthony de Padua Hosp., 178
N.E.2d 303 (Ill. 1961) (upholding constitutionality of damage limitation in wrongful
1958) (upholding constitutionality
death statute); Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352 (I11.
of time limitations in wrongful death statute).
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B. Workers' CompensationStatutes-The Paradigmfor
Legislative Retrieval of Common Law Causes of Action
The legislative development of Illinois tort law was not only a
phenomenon of the nineteenth century; it continued into this century.
The Illinois' workers' compensation statute is a particularly relevant
example."
In Illinois, as in other states, workers' compensation statutes
reflected a radical departure from the common law: the statutes
abolished all common law damages for pain and suffering and
provided limited recovery of economic losses and no punitive
damages. The jury "system" was replaced by an administrative
board.5 8 As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained, "The
Workmen's CompensationAct affects a complete change in the rights
and liabilitiesof an employer and his employee in regard to accidental
injuries to the employee. The common law actionfor negligence can
no longer be maintained but the statutory remedy, alone, is
available. 59
Nevertheless, Illinois courts have consistently respected the General
Assembly's choice to abolish the common law relating to workplace
injuries and to replace it with workers' compensation legislation. 6
C. The GeneralAssembly Has Continued to
Develop Illinois Tort Law
The legislature's orderly development of Illinois tort policy has
continued to keep pace with the public policy needs of the state.
Statutes of repose and modifications to the collateral source rule are
examples of the General Assembly's orderly development of tort
policy.
1. Statutes of Repose
Statutes of repose provide an outer time limit on potential "long-tail"
liability and reduce costs associated with defending stale claims.
These laws represent a legislative policy judgment that, after a number
57. 1911 Iil. Laws 315 (codified at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/1-30 (West
1993)).
58. See ARTHUR LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND
DEATH (desk ed. 1991).
59. Johnson v. Choate, 119 N.E. 972, 974 (111.1918) (emphasis added) (holding that
use of Industrial Board to decide workers' compensation cases did not contravene Illinois
constitution as unlawful delegation of judicial powers to arbitrators).
60. See id.; Moushon v. Nat'l Garages, Inc., 137 N.E.2d 842 (I11. 1956) (upholding
as constitutional limitations on recovery provided in Workmen's Compensation Act).
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of years, it is inappropriate to bring a lawsuit regarding a product that
is very old and may have been altered, modified or not repaired, or an
activity that is long since over. Most state courts have recognized that
statutes of repose represent a public policy "judgment call" and have
upheld them. 6'
The Illinois General Assembly has modified common law causes of
action through statutes of repose in a wide range of areas, including
improvements to real property, 62 product liability actions, 63 and
malpractice. 6' The Illinois Supreme Court has declared these laws to
be constitutionalexercises of legislative authority. 65

61. See, e.g., Anderson v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 766 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1988); Daily v.
New Britain Mach. Co., 512 A.2d 893 (Conn. 1986); Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 449
S.E.2d 602 (Ga. 1994); Radke v. H.C. Davis Sons Mfg. Co., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 204
(Neb. 1992).
62. Pub. Act. No. 82-280 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-214 (West
Supp. 1997)) (providing that no actions for injury arising from improvements to real
property may be maintained more than four years after plaintiff knew or should have
known of cause of action, but in any case no more than 10 years after act or omission
causing the injury).
63. Pub. Act. No. 82-280 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-213 (West
Supp. 1997)) (providing that no product liability action under any theory may be raised
more than two years after plaintiff knew or should have known of injury, but in any case
no more than 12 years from date of first sale of product or 10 years of the initial sale by
retailer).
64. Pub. Act. No. 82-280 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-212 (West
Supp. 1997)) (providing that no action shall be maintained against a physician, dentist,
nurse, or hospital for injury arising from medical services more than two years after
plaintiff knew or should have known of injury, but in any case no more than four years
after act or omission allegedly giving rise to injury).
65. See Mega v. Holy Cross Hosp., 490 N.E.2d 665 (Ill. 1986) (statute of repose
relating to medical malpractice actions does not violate certain remedies clause of
Illinois constitution); People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc.,
500 N.E.2d 34 (I11.1986) (statute of repose relating to improvements to real property is
not unconstitutional special legislation); Adcock v. Montgomery Elev. Co., 654 N.E.2d
631 (I11. App. Ct., 1st Dist. 1995) (statute of repose relating to improvements to real
property does not violate Illinois constitution's certain remedies provision); Thompson
v. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp., 578 N.E.2d 289 (I11.App. Ct., 3d Dist. 1991)
(statute of repose relating to medical malpractice actions does not violate special
legislation, certain remedies, due process, or equal protection clauses of the Illinois
constitution); Billman v. Crown-Trygg Corp., 563 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist.
1990) (statute of repose relating to improvements to real property does not violate
Illinois' equal protection clause); Cross v. Ainsworth Seed Co., 557 N.E.2d 906 (III.
App. Ct., 4th Dist. 1990) (products liability statute of repose relating to improvements
to real property does not constitute unconstitutional special legislation); Costello v.
Unarco Indus., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. App. Ct., 4th Dist. 1984) (statute of repose
relating to product liability actions arising from exposure to asbestos does not violate
Illinois constitution's special legislation, certain remedy, due process, or equal
protection clauses).
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2. Modifications to the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule, which developed in common law
decisions, establishes that a plaintiff can obtain a judgment, even
though he or she already has received compensation for a specific
harm, if that compensation came from a source that is not connected
with (i.e., is "collateral" to) the defendant. The common law rule is
based on the assumption that the defendant is a "wrongdoer," the
plaintiff has been "provident" in buying insurance, and the defendant
should not benefit from the plaintiff's providence.
In modern times, however, plaintiffs may benefit from the
''collateral source rule" even though the sources of payment for their
injuries do not stem from their own "providence." A plaintiff may
receive workers' compensation, health benefits, or other funds that he
or she did not purchase. With these facts in mind, plus a fiscal
resources policy judgment that a "double recovery" is inappropriate, a
legislative public policy determination can be made that the old
66
common law collateral source rule should be modified or abolished.
In 1981, the Illinois General Assembly altered the common law
collateral source rule.67 The new law permitted a plaintiff's tort
recovery to be reduced by the amount of collateral source payments
received by the plaintiff.68 The Illinois Supreme Court has upheld the
legislature's collateral source rule reform law. 69
3. Other Examples
The above examples are illustrative, but not exhaustive, of the
Illinois General Assembly's development of tort policy in recent years.
There are other examples:
The General Assembly, acting in response to judicial
decisions, has modified Illinois law regarding governmental70
66. Recent data suggests that use of the "collateral source" rule contributes to inflated
damages claims. See STEVEN CARROLL & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, THE COSTS OF EXCESSIVE
MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (RAND Institute For Civil Justice,
March 1995). See also Jeffrey O'Connell, Must Health and Disability Insurance
Subsidize Wasteful Injury Suits?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 1055 (1989).
67. Pub. Act. No. 82-280 (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205 (West
Supp. 1997)).
68. See id.
69. See Bemier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 775 (111.1986) (upholding the legislative
modifications to the common law collateral source rule) ("It is well recognized that the
collateral-source rule is of common law origin and can be changed by statute") (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 920A cmt. d (1979)).
70. In 1965, the General Assembly enacted The Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 1965 I11.Laws 2983, § 1-101 (codified at
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/1-101 (West 1993)), which defined the state's policy in
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and charitable immunity. 7' These laws have been upheld as
constitutional."
* The General Assembly, exercising its public policy
prerogative, has preserved spousal immunity 73 and limited
recoveries for gratuitous guests.74 These laws have been
upheld as constitutional.75
* In 1971, the General Assembly enacted a "blood shield"
statute to limit the liability of suppliers of human blood and
tissue.7 6 The law is based on the policy judgment that openended liability could lead to the unavailability of critical blood
and tissue supplies.
It has been declared to be
constitutional.77
the field of tort immunity. The legislation was a response to Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit Dist., 163 N.E.2d 89 (Il. 1959), which ended the common law doctrine
of sovereign immunity for local governments. See also Metropolitan Transit Authority
Act, 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3605/41 (West 1993).

71. In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished common law immunity for tort
actions against charitable entities. See Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem'l Hosp.,
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965). The legislature later acted to restore common law charitable
immunity in some circumstances. Pub. Act. No. 82-580, § 4 (codified at 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/4 (West Supp. 1997)) (providing immunity for charitable organizations
which distribute donated food).
72. See, e.g., Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Auth., 531 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 1988) (statute
immunizing transit authority from tort liability for injuries sustained by passengers as a
result of criminal actions committed by third parties is constitutional); King v.
Johnson, 265 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. 1970) (upholding constitutionality of notice provision
in Local Government and Government Employees Tort Immunity Act); Niziolek v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 620 N.E.2d 1097 (Il. App. Ct., Ist Dist. 1993) (holding that
notice requirement under Metropolitan Transit Authority Act does not violate Illinois
state equal protection clause).
73. In Brandt v. Keller, 109 N.E.2d 729 (Ill. 1952), the court held that the Married
Women's Act of 1874 modified common law by allowing women to sue their husbands
both in contract and in tort. Id. at 731. The legislature later amended the Married
Women's Act to restore spousal immunity. Pub. Act. No. 86-1324, §331 (codified at
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 (West 1996)).

74. Pub. Act. No. 76-1586 (codified at 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-201 (West
1993)). The guest statute modifies the common law by requiring a gratuitous guest to
prove willful and wanton negligence (as distinguished from simple negligence) against
the owner or operator of a motor vehicle before the guest can recover.
75. See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 213 N.E.2d 544 (111. 1966) (upholding
constitutionality of spousal immunity act); Clarke v. Storchak, 52 N.E.2d 229 (I11.
1943) (upholding constitutionality of Illinois' guest statute); Koskela v. Martin, 414
N.E.2d 1148 (I11. App. Ct., 1st Dist. 1980) (public policy regarding intra-family
immunity best left to legislature).
76. Pub. Act. No. 77-184, § 3 (1971) (codified at 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/2
(West 1993 & Supp. 1996)).
77. See Glass v. Ingalls Mem'l Hosp., 336 N.E. 495 (Iil. App. Ct., 2d Dist. 1975)
(upholding constitutionality of blood shield law from challenge that it constituted
special legislation). Accord Hill v. Jackson Park Hosp., 349 N.E.2d 541 (111.App. Ct.,
1st Dist. 1976).
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* In 1979, the General Assembly codified the common law
doctrine of contribution. 8
* In 1985, the General Assembly enacted comprehensive
medical malpractice reform legislation to reduce the burdens
existing in the health professions, in part, as a result of
frivolous lawsuits. 79 Reforms included the creation of
medical review panels to screen cases, modification of the
collateral source rule,80 periodic payment of damages82
awards, 8' a prohibition on the award of punitive damages,
and limits on contingent fees.8 3 These comprehensive
medical malpractice reforms (with the limited exception of the
medical review panel provision) have been declared by the
Illinois Supreme Court to be constitutional. 84
" A year later, in 1986, after the Illinois Supreme Court
abolished the historic common law doctrine of contributory
negligence and adopted in its place a system of "pure"
comparative fault, 85 the General Assembly responded by
enacting a "modified" comparative fault statute.86 This statute
has been upheld as constitutional.87
In sum, Illinois courts have repeatedly respected the legislature's
prerogative to set forth the tort policy of the state; they have not held
these policy judgments to be unconstitutional.

78. Pub. Act. No. 81-601, § 2 (1979) (codified at 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/2
(West 1993)). The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of contribution among
joint tortfeasors in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437
(111.1977). We are aware of no reported challenges to the contribution statute.
79. See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
81. Pub. Act. No. 84-7, § I (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1705 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996)).
82. Pub. Act. No. 84-7, § I (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996)).
83. Pub. Act. No. 84-7, § I (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1114 (West
1993 & Supp. 1996)).
84. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139 (i11.
1992); Bernier v.
Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763 (III. 1986).
85. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (111.
1981).
86. Pub. Act. No. 84-1431, art. IV., § I (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21116 (West Supp. 1997)).
87. See Reuter v. Korb, 616 N.E.2d 1363 (111.
App. Ct., 2d Dist. 1993) (upholding
the constitutionality of the comparative negligence statute and rejecting appellant's
argument that, because the Alvis court had established pure comparative negligence,
then under the Illinois separation of powers clause, only the courts of Illinois (as
opposed to the legislature) could modify the Alvis "pure" comparative fault rule).
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D. The Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 Is The
Most Recent Legislative Adjustment of Illinois Tort Law
The Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 ("Civil Justice
Reform Act") 88 is merely the most recent adjustment by the Illinois
General Assembly of the broad tort policy interests of the state. As
Illinois Senate Majority Leader Kirk Dillard, a chief architect of the
Civil Justice Reform Act, recently explained:
Our system reached so far in an effort to compensate those who
were injured that it stressed the award of large sums of money to
individuals without due consideration to the true magnitude of
the harm, the individual or entity which caused the harm, or the
impact than an individual award may have had on society at
large. . . . [The Act] struck a much needed balance between
permitting the redress of all 9grievances and maintaining a
workable, efficient, fair system.8
The Act sought to "return fairness, predictability, and responsibility
to the Illinois civil justice system." 90 It also sought to "hold down the
incredible costs of civil litigation" and to address "flaws in the past
product liability system."9' While some of the provisions in the Civil
Justice Reform Act are new, others represent extensions of laws
already declared by the Illinois Supreme Court to be valid exercises of
legislative policymaking. Clearly, the Act reflects sound public policy
and is consistent with Illinois legal history. 92
The Civil Justice Reform Act is also consistent with a strong trend
throughout the United States. In 1995, approximately nineteen states,
including Indiana, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin, enacted civil
justice reform legislation.93 This trend continued in 1996 with the
enactment of comprehensive liability reform legislation in Ohio,
Louisiana, and Michigan.94 These policy decisions by legislatures
should be respected.

88. Pub. Act. No. 89-7, § 15 (1995) (codified in scattered sections at 430, 730, 735,
740, 745, 815, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. (West Supp. 1997)).
89. Kirk W. Dillard, Illinois' Landmark Tort Reform: The Sponsor's Policy
Explanation, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 805, 808-09, 812 (1996).
90. Id. at 806.
91. Id. at 811.
92. See supra notes 61-87 discussing the General Assembly's modifications of tort
law principles.
93. See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Mark D. Taylor, Stamping Out Tort
Reform: State Courts Lack Proper Respect for Legislative Judgments, LEGAL TIMES, Feb.
10, 1997, at 534.
94. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION

The legislature has both an historic right and a public responsibility
to formulate tort or liability legislation.95 In many instances, these
legislative enactments arose as a response to, or a clarification of, a
judicial decision which carried tort law into a new area.96 Illinois has a

rich history of cooperation and respect between the legislature and the
courts in developing the law of torts, either through the common law
or statutory law.97 Some of these legislative modifications have
limited causes of action available to plaintiffs, but others have opened
courthouse doors. 98 Regardless of who "benefitted"-plaintiffs or
defendants-the courts have, in general, respected the legislative
prerogative.99
The 1995 Civil Justice Reform Act is a continuation of the Illinois
legislature's historic role in developing the broad tort policy interests
of the state.'00 As a matter of history and good public policy, the
legislation should be respected by Illinois courts. ° !

95.
96.
97.
98.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.A-B.

99. See supra Part IV.C.
100. See supra Part IV.D.
101. SeesupraPartV.

